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FAMILY LAW-ADOPTION-REVISED UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT. 1977
Ark. Acts 735.
In 1977 the Arkansas 71st General Assembly passed the Revised
Uniform Adoption Act.' The bill was signed by Governor David
Pryor on March 31, 1977, and went into effect July 5, 1977.2 While
only four other states have passed the RUAA, 3 at least twenty-five
states have recently revised their adoption statutes.'
The RUAA differs in many aspects from previous Arkansas
adoption statutes.5 There are major alterations in the areas of con-
sent, inheritance, jurisdiction, venue, secrecy, and notice. There are
several new sections concerning the termination and relinquishment
of parental rights, execution of consent, and disclosure of peti-
tioner's expenditures that relate to the adoption. The following note
is a review of the major changes in the Arkansas law on adoptions
followed by a brief discussion of related social issues. The statutory
topics are arranged whenever possible in the sequential order in
which they statutorily appear.
I. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Who Can Adopt
Under prior Arkansas law a minor could not adopt.' The RUAA,
however, specifically allows adoption by "a husband and wife to-
gether although one or both are minors. 7 The statute also provides
for adoption by "the unmarried father or mother of the individual
to be adopted." 8 It is not clear whether a minor who wants to adopt
[Editor's Note: The editors and author of this note would like to thank Judge Thomas
F. Butt of Fayetteville, Arkansas, and William Sherman, Representative to the Arkansas
House of Representatives and sponsor of the RUAA, for their helpful comments.]
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-201 to 221 (Cum. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as RUAAJ.
Originally enacted as 1977 Ark. Acts 735, §§ 1 to 22, the RUAA is a modified form of the
Uniform Adoption Act.
2. 1977 Ark. Acts 735, § 22.
3. These states are Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico and Oklahoma.
4. Research Dep't., Arkansas Legislative Council, Informational Memo No. 226,
Adoptions in Arkansas and Other States (1976) [hereinafter cited as Arkansas Adoptions].
This study was prepared by the Research Department of the Arkansas Legislative Council
for the Joint Interim Committee on Judiciary. It includes a comparison of the former Arkan-
sas adoption laws to the RUAA, as well as empirical data compiled through questionnaires
sent to the Arkansas Child Welfare Services, the surrounding states, and the attorney gener-
als of every state.
5. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-101 to 125 (1971) (repealed 1977).
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-101 (1971) (repealed 1977) stated in pertinent part that "[any
person of lawful age may file a petition for adoption."
7. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-204 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
8. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-204 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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his minor child may do so under this provision of the RUAA.
Under the RUAA, there are exceptions to the requirement that
the spouse of the adopting individual join in the adoption petition
which were not included in the prior law Under both the new and
the old law, the petitioner's spouse need not join in the petition if
that spouse is the biological parent of the individual to be adopted. 0
Under the RUAA, a married person who is legally separated from
his spouse may adopt without that spouse's consent." This provi-
sion was not a part of previous Arkansas law, and it is a good exam-
ple of the way in which the RUAA makes adoption available to more
people. It seems to reflect the changing social values of the family
unit. Another provision not formerly part of the Arkansas law allows
the court to excuse the spouse from joining in the petition for the
following reasons: "prolonged unexplained absence, unavailability,
incapacity, or circumstances constituting an unreasonable with-
holding of consent."'" This subsection delegates more discretion to
the trial judge than the former statute which did not allow adop-
tion unless the petitioner's spouse consented to it or was the child's
natural parent.
B. Venue
The RUAA contains a multiple venue provision which increases
the number of forums available to the petitioner. Under the RUAA,
a petition may be brought in the court of the place in which "the
petitioners or the individual to be adopted resides, or is in military
service, or in which the agency having care, custody or control of the
minor is located.' 13 These new provisions add choices of venue not
previously allowed to the petitioners."
9. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-101 (1971) (repealed 1977) which provided in perti-
nent part that "[n]o petition by a married person shall be filed unless the husband and wife
both join therein, except when the petitioner is married to one of the child's natural parents"
with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-204(4)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1977) which added a provision allowing
the petitioner to adopt without his spouse's joining the petition if they are legally separated.
10. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-204(4)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1977) with ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 56-101 (1971) (repealed 1977).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-204(4)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
12. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-204(4)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-205(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. Under a prior statute the petition had to be brought in "the county where the person
to be adopted resides." The residence of the child was determined to be either the county
from which he was removed or surrendered, or the county in which the child was living at
the time of the filing of the petition. ARK. STAT. ANN. 56-102 (1971) (repealed 1977). Residency
for purposes of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-205 (Cum. Supp. 1977) could be construed to mean
domicile. See Taylor v. Collins, 172 Ark. 541, 289 S.W. 466 (1927); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 18.2 at 606 (1968). It appears that the residency requirement is one of jurisdiction
[Vol. 2
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C. Notice
The notice provisions of the RUAA relate to two different
areas-notice of a petition to terminate the parent-child relation-
ship 5 and notice of the petition for adoption. 6 The procedure in-
volves the following steps: (1) determining whose consent to the
adoption is required; 7 (2) then excluding certain parties whose con-
sent is not required; 18 and (3) finally determining those parties who
have to be given notice but whose consent may not be required."
In accordance with the former Arkansas adoption law," the
RUAA does not require that notice be given to the father of an
illegitimate child. The absence of required notice presents a consti-
tutional problem. In 1955, a commentator stated that notice need
not be given to the parent of an illegitimate child who had furnished
neither substantial care nor material provision to the child.' The
issue of whether notice must be given to a father who had supported
his illegitimate children. arose in 1972 in Stanley v. Illinois."" An
Illinois statute provided that the illegitimate children of unwed
mothers became wards of the state upon the mother's death. The
rather than one of venue and, thus, cannot be waived. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 18.2 at n.32 (1968) (citing UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT, (U.L.A.) § 4 (1975) (revised
1973)). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) which defines residence as
actual presence for purposes of divorce.
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(b)(2) and (f) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
17. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-206 (Cum. Supp. 1977) lists those persons who must consent
unless they are not required to do so under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207(9)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) states as follows:
Except as provided in section 12 [§ 56-212] notice of a hearing on a petition
for adoption need not be given to a person whose consent is not required or to a
person whose consent or relinquishment has been filed with the petition.
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides as follows:
After the filing of a petition to adopt a minor, the Court shall fix a time and place
for hearing the petition. At least twenty (20) days before the date of hearing, notice
of the filing of the petition and of the time and place of hearing shall be given by
the petition [petitioner] to [1] any agency or person whose consent to the adop-
tion is required by this Act [§§ 56-201-56-2211 but who has not consented; 121
(3) a person whose consent is dispensed with upon any ground mentioned in para-
graphs (2), (6), (8) and (9) of subsection (a) of Section 7 [subsection (a), (2), (6),
(8) and (9) of § 56-2061 but who has not consented; and 13] (4) a parent who has
deserted or abandoned a child except that notice may be excused by the court upon
a showing that reasonable efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful.
20. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106(c) (1971) (repealed 1977) stated that, "In case of illegiti-
macy, the consent of the mother shall suffice except where paternity has been established by
judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-104(a) (1971)
(repealed 1977) provided that notice was required to be given to only those individuals whose
consent was required.
21. Uhlenhopp, Adoption in Iowa, 40 IOWA L. REv. 228 (1955).
22. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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putative father had lived with the family and provided support until
the mother died, at which time the state took custody of the chil-
dren. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute vio-
lated the unmarried fathe 's fourteenth amendment right to equal
protection.13 In addition, the father was not given the right to a
hearing as to his fitness as a parent. 2 The Court in Stanley held
that a state may not terminate parental rights until notice is given
to a putative father who has established a parental relationship.
The requirement of notice set out in Stanley has been held
applicable to adoption proceedings. 25 In a survey completed for the
Arkansas legislature, twenty-nine states reported that they had ei-
ther changed their adoption statutes to comply with the Stanley
decision or had re-examined their statutes to ascertain whether they
were in conflict with the holding in Stanley.6 In this report it was
pointed out that the Arkansas adoption statute which was in effect
at the time27 was inconsistent with the decision in Stanley.2 The
RUAA does not require that notice be given to the putative father
unless he has custody of the minor at the time of the petition,2 but
the putative father in Stanley did not have custody, actual or other-
wise, at the time of the dependency proceeding.
30
Under the RUAA, a putative father will receive notice if he has
"otherwise legitimated the minor according to the laws of the place
in which the adoption proceeding is brought."'3 The Stanley deci-
sion, however, recognized that a parental relationship may be estab-
lished even though a minor was not legitimated according to the
laws of a particular state.3 2 It therefore appears that in order to
comply with the Stanley decision, one must give notice of the peti-
tion for adoption to the putative father even though it may not be
required by statute.
Under previous Arkansas statutory law, a minor parent could
consent to the adoption of that minor's child. 31 It was held in
23. Id. at 649.
24. Id.
25. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), rev'g &
remanding sub nom. mem., Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Serv., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), on
remand sub nom. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Serv., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
26. Arkansas Adoptions, supra note 4, at 39-41.
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106(c) (1971) (repealed 1977).
28. Arkansas Adoptions, supra note 4, at 14, 39.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN.' §§ 56-206(2), -207(3), -212 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 667 (1972).
31. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-206(2), -207(3), -212 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
32. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
33. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106(d) (1971) (repealed 1977).
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Schrum v. Bolding,34 however, that a minor mother's consent was
invalid because she was not properly served with process prior to the
entry of an interlocutory order of adoption. In Schrum the minor's
entry of appearance and consent was not considered to be a waiver
because a minor cannot waive service of process. Additionally, a
guardian had not been appointed to represent the minor parent, 35
and the court held that a judgment rendered against an infant who
had no guardian ad litem was reversible error, although not neces-
sarily void .3 It would appear, therefore, that under the ruling in
Schrum, a guardian ad litem must be appointed to represent minor
parents. The RUAA makes no provision for this situation, and the
Schrum decision should be viewed as an additional requirement in
situations in which a minor's consent is necessary."
D. Disclosure and Investigation
The RUAA requires that the petitioner estimate the value of
any property which the minor may own.3 8 In addition, the RUAA
adds a new section which requires a petitioner to file an accounting
of all disbursements of anything of value made, or agreed to be
made, in connection with the adoption proceeding."
Various approaches have been taken to prevent the outright
sale of children and to curb excessive professional fees in connection
with adoptions, but the following approaches appear to be the most
prevalent: (1) legislation prohibiting most nonstate placements; (2)
criminal sanctions against improper placements; and (3) thorough
investigation of the adoptive parents. 0 Arkansas has utilized the
investigative method of control in two ways. Prior to 1953, Arkansas
law required the petitioner to notify the Child Welfare Division that
the petition for adoption had been filed.' The Child Welfare Divi-
sion would then review the petition, investigate the petitioners, and
34. 260 Ark. 114, 539 S.W.2d 415 (1976).
35. Id. at 118, 539 S.W.2d at 417. The court construed the Arkansas statutes that
provided for the appointment of a guardian to defend a minor. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-
825, -826 (1962).
36. Schrum v. Bolding, 260 Ark. 114, 118, 539 S.W.2d 415, 417 (1976). Contra, In re
Morrison, 560 P.2d 240 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
37. The RUAA states that service of process is to be made under the appropriate rules
of civil procedure in this state. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(f) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-210 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
40. Comment, Independent Adoptions: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 ViLL. L. REV.
116 (1967).
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-105 (1971) (amended by 1953 Ark. Acts 254, § 1) (repealed
1977).
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file a report with the court. The procedure was later changed to
allow the court to decide when the Child Welfare Division should
investigate."
The RUAA provides that the court may require an investigation
and report by the Child Welfare Division. 3 It states that "the Court
may waive the investigation only if it appears that waiver is in the
best interest of the minor and that the adoptive home and the minor
are suited to each other."4 The Act also provides that an investiga-
tion is not required in cases where the state agency 5 is a party, a
stepparent is the petitioner, or the individual to be adopted is an
adult."
E. Who Must Consent
The RUAA provides who must consent to an adoption, when
that consent must be given, how the consent should be executed,
and when consent may be withdrawn. As in prior law, the RUAA
requires that if the individual to be adopted is a minor over a certain
age, he must consent to the adoption, 47 but the RUAA lowers the age
at which the minor must consent from fourteen years to ten years
of age.8 The study prepared for the Arkansas Legislature revealed
that none of the surrounding states required the minor to consent
at such a young age.4 '
A new requirement included in the RUAA is that the spouse of
the individual to be adopted must consent to the adoption.50 This
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-105 (1971) (repealed 1977).
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
44. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Another difficulty occurs in this
section. In the last sentence the wording implies that the consent of the agency is required.
The sentence should read "[tihe Arkansas Social Services when it is required to consent to
the adoption may give consent without making the investigation because Ark. Stat. Ann. §
56-206 (Cum. Supp. 1977) does not specifically require the consent of the agency.
45. Agency is defined in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-202(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977), as meaning
"any person certified, licensed, or otherwise specially empowered by law or rule to place
minors for adoption."
46. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-206(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-107 (1971)
(repealed 1977).
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-206(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
49. Arkansas Adoptions, supra note 4, at 37-38. Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee
hold the consent of the minor at age 14; Oklahoma and Texas holding the age at 12. At the
time the RUAA was under consideration Judge Butt said the following: "By legislative fiat
to assume that a 10, 11, or 12 year old is wise enough to make this decision is flying in the
face of human experience." Judge Butt further stated that few problems were encountered
with the previous age limit and that there were no good reasons for the change. Letter from
Judge Thomas F. Butt to Rep. David J. Burleson (Feb. 11, 1975).
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-206(a)(6), -206(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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is an important change because an adopted child under the RUAA
inherits only from his adoptive parents.-' The RUAA also allows
the court which has jurisdiction for determining custody of the
minor to consent to the adoption "if the legal guardian or custodian
of the person of the minor is not empowered to consent to the adop-
tion." 5 Under the former Arkansas statute 3 the court did not have
the power to consent in this situation.
The RUAA specifies certain individuals whose consent is not
required. 54 As previously noted, the RUAA does not give the puta-
tive father the right to notice or consent when he does not have
custody of the child or has not legitimated the child." In Quilloin
v. Walcott56 the United States Supreme Court construed a Georgia
statute" that dispensed with the necessity of the consent of the
father of an illegitimate child in an adoption proceeding. The father
in Quilloin had supported his illegitimate child on an irregular
basis. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the biological father
had no right to withhold consent and distinguished Stanley on the
basis that the putative father in Stanley was a de facto member of
the family unit.58 The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
pointing out that the unwed father in Quilloin had not sought or
received actual or legal custody of his child, nor had he shouldered
any responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of the child. 59 Therefore, the Court held that
the state's interest in caring for the child was substantial and
that the father's interests were adequately protected by the "best
interests of the child" standard. 0 In light of the Quilloin and
Stanley decisions, it appears necessary to notify the father in any
adoption proceeding involving an illegitimate child where the puta-
tive father may have provided regular support.
A parent who has relinquished his parental rights under title 56,
section 220 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated' has no right of
requisite consent. The consent of a parent may also be dispensed
with when the court terminates the parental relationship under this
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See section I. K. infra.
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-206(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (repealed 1977).
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
55. See section I. C. supra.
56. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973).
58. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), affd, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
59. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
60. Id. at 254.
61. (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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section of the RUAA. The procedures involved in the relinquish-
ment and termination of parental rights will be discussed more fully
under that topical heading."2
The court may excuse the necessity of a legal guardian's con-
sent to the adoption if it finds that the guardian is unreasonably
withholding consent . 3 This provision is consistent with the result in
Ratcliffe v. Williams4 wherein the Director of the Arkansas Child
Welfare Division, who had been appointed guardian to the child,
refused to consent to the adoption. The court, in spite of the Arkan-
sas statute which required the guardian to consent, held that the
Director's consent need not be obtained. The court thereby added
a provision to existing statutory adoption law that an adoption
could be granted upon permission of the probate court.' 5 Thus, in
this respect, the RUAA is a statutory enactment of a prior decision
of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The consent of a parent may also be dispensed with if the
parent either abandons or deserts the child or otherwise fails to
fulfill parental duties. Abandonment previously had to continue for
more than six months. 6 Under the RUAA abandonment need not
be for six months; furthermore, there is no time limit if a parent
deserts the child without affording a means of identification for the
child.67 The parent's consent also is not required if the child is in
the custody of another person and if for one year the parent has not,
without justifiable cause, (1) communicated with the child or (2)
supported the child as required by law or judicial decree. "
The RUAA requires that notice be given when there has been
an abandonment or when the parent fails to perform parental du-
ties.69 These provisions are consistent with the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Armstrong v. Manzo7t in which the Court
found a due process violation under a Texas law that did not require
notice to, and consent of, a legitimate parent who had allegedly
deserted his child for more than two years.7'
Even though the Arkansas Supreme Court has not yet encoun-
62. See section I. L. infra.
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207(a)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
64. 220 Ark. 807, 250 S.W.2d 330 (1952).
65. Id. at 809, 250 S.W.2d at 351; see 7 ARK. L. REV. 130 (1953).
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106(b)(I) (1971) (repealed 1977).
67. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-207(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
70. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
71. Id. at 551.
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tered the problem faced in Armstrong, it has defined abandonment
to mean conduct which evidences a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties for the statutory period." In applying this definition,
the court has consistently refused to find abandonment except in
the most persuasive cases.1
3
F. How Consent is Executed
The RUAA created new law for Arkansas by providing how
one's consent should be executed. The consent of the individual to
be adopted must be made in the presence of the court,7 ' while the
consent of any other person may be made in the presence of the
court or before a person authorized to take acknowledgements. 5
When a consent is executed before the court "it will need no further
formalities."16 The director or representative for the state adoption
agency may consent for that agency." In addition to this, the con-
sent need not identify the adopting parents if the person giving his
consent states that he consented without requiring the informa-
tion." This part of the RUAA is directed toward protecting the
secrecy of the proceedings. As mentioned before, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court held in Schrum v. Bolding"9 that a guardian ad litem
must be appointed for a minor parent whose consent is required in
an adoption proceeding. The guardian may accept service of process
and properly defend the minor parent's interest.
72. Zgleszewski v. Zgleszewski, 260 Ark. 629, 542 S.W.2d 765 (1976); Walthall v. Hime,
236 Ark. 689, 368 S.W.2d 77 (1963); Woodson v. Lee, 221 Ark. 517, 254 S.W.2d 326 (1953).
The Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted the following definition of abandonment:
To relinquish or give up with the intent of never again resuming or claiming one's
rights or interests in; to give up absolutely; to forsake entirely; to renounce utterly;
to relinquish all connection with or concern in; to desert, as a person to whom one
is bound by a special relation of allegiance or fidelity; to quit; to foresake.
Id. at 521, 254 S.W.2d at 329 (quoting WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY).
73. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held the following: (1) that permitting a child to
remain for a time undisturbed in the custody of another is not abandonment, Woodson v.
Lee, 221 Ark. 517, 254 S.W.2d 326 (1953); (2) that supplying money to support the child and
the filing of a writ of habeas corpus before the petition for adoption is filed rebuts any intent
to abandon, Walthall v. Hime, 236 Ark. 689, 368 S.W.2d 77 (1963); and (3) that absence due
to incarceration is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment, Zgleszewski v. Zgleszewski,
260 Ark. 629, 542 S.W.2d 765 (1976).
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-208(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
75. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-208(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). A notary public is authorized
to take acknowledgments.
76. UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT, (U.L.A.) § 7, Commissioner's note, at 22.
77. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-208(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-208(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
79. 260 Ark. 114, 539 S.W.2d 415 (1976). See section I. C. supra.
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G. Withdrawal of Consent
The question of when a consent may be withdrawn has been a
heavily litigated issue. Formerly in Arkansas consent could be with-
drawn before the entry of an interlocutory order almost as a matter
of right.80 After the entry of an interlocutory order, but before a final
order, consent could be revoked at the discretion of the court, de-
pending upon all the circumstances." After the entry of a final
decree, however, consent could not be revoked.8 1
Under the RUAA, consent may be withdrawn prior to the de-
cree in the discretion of the court, but only after all parties have had
an opportunity to be heard. The best interest of the child is the
standard which the court must apply. 83 After an interlocutory or
final decree has been rendered, consent is irrevocable.84 This section
of the RUAA is the exception to the general rule that the Act tends
to grant greater judicial discretion.
Under the RUAA, a hearing may be held and a decree may be
entered twenty days after notice of the filing of the petition is given
to the proper persons. 5 Formerly in Arkansas all persons whose
consents were required were given thirty days after summons in
which to answer the petition.88 Failure to answer foreclosed the
party from further contesting the procedure. s7
H. Orders
There are two basic types of decrees or orders in adoption pro-
ceedings. The first type is the interlocutory or temporary order; the
second type is a final order. Prior to the passage of the RUAA, a
80. Smith, Adoptions in Arkansas, 14 ARK. L. REV. 69, 77 (1959). In Combs v. Edmiston,
216 Ark. 270, 225 S.W.2d 26 (1949) an unwed mother was allowed to revoke her consent before
the entry of an interlocutory decree because she alleged she was in a critical emotional and
physical state when her consent was given.
81. Siebert v. Benson, 243 Ark. 843, 422 S.W.2d 683 (1968); Martin v. Ford, 224 Ark.
993, 277 S.W.2d 842 (1955); A. v. B., 217 Ark. 844, 233 S.W.2d 629 (1950).
82. Smith, supra note 80.
83. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-209(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-209(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). But see In re Adoption of Graves,
481 P.2d 136, 138 (Okla. 1971) in which the biological parents of an adopted child were
allowed to attack the adoption decree on the grounds that their consent had been procured
by fraud and duress, pursuant to a one year statute of limitations in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 95 (6) (West 1961). The court allowed the parents to attack the decree notwithstanding
the provision for finality of adoption decrees in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.10 (West 1966),
the pertinent provision of Oklahoma's version of the Uniform Adoption Act adopted in 1957.
See 7 TULSA L. REV. 207 (1971). See also note 97 infra.
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
86. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-104 (1971) (repealed 1977).
87. Id.
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court, when granting a petition for adoption, would enter an interlo-
cutory order and place the child in the custody of the petitioner.,,
After six months the petitioner could request a final decree which
was ordinarily granted in the absence of valid objections." Where
an adult was being adopted, the court could only enter a final
order. 0
The RUAA gives the court more options by providing that a
final decree shall not be issued and an interlocutory decree may not
become final until the minor to be adopted has lived in the adoptive
home for at least six months after the agency placement or for at
least six months after the petition is filed."' When the court grants
an initial petition, it may, subject to the previously stated provi-
sions, grant either a final order or an interlocutory order.12 An inter-
locutory order will automatically become final after the lapse of a
period of time set out in the order. That period may not be less than
six months nor more than 6he year. 3 The court may set aside an
interlocutory order before it becomes final if good cause is shown.9'
I. Appeal
Only a final order or an interlocutory order that has become
final may be appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court." The RUAA
changes the statute of limitations for appeal to one year instead of
two years." The adoption proceeding may be attacked on any valid
grounds before the statute of limitations runs. 7 Formerly, Arkansas
law contained an annulment statute which provided that in certain
situations an adoption order could be abrogated. 8 There is no an-
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-108(e) (1971) (repealed 1977).
89. Williams v. Nash, 247 Ark. 135, 445 S.W.2d 69 (1969).
90. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-123 (1971) (repealed 1977).
91. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-213 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
92. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-214(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-216 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-111 (1971)
(repealed 1977).'
96. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-216 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-
112 (1971) (repealed 1977).
97. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-216(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides:
Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one [11] year after
an adoption decree is issued the decree cannot be questioned by any person includ-
ing the petitioner, in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresen-
tation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of
the subject matter, unless, in the case of the adoption of a minor the petitioner has
not taken custody of the minor, or, in the case of the adoption of an adult, the adult
had no knowledge of the decree within the one [1] year period.
98. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-110 (1971) (repealed 1977).
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nulment provision in the RUAA. Therefore, a final order may only
be attacked within the one year period of limitation. The statute of
limitations is tolled (1) when an appeal has been brought; (2) when
the adoptive parents have not taken custody of the minor to be
adopted; or (3) when the adopted adult has had no knowledge of the
adoption within the one year period."
J. Secrecy
Prior to 1955, the records of adoption proceedings, although
confidential, could be inspected by the interested parties and their
attorneys, representatives of the state Child Welfare Division, or
anyone else obtaining permission of the court.0 9 Later, this section
was changed to allow inspection only by persons who were found to
have good cause.' 0' Under the RUAA, the proceedings are held in
closed court and "are subject to inspection only upon consent of the
court and all interested persons."'' 0 The Act also provides for judi-
cial discretion in "exceptional cases."'0 3 Thus the RUAA, proceed-
ing in the direction of previous Arkansas law, strengthens the se-
crecy of the proceedings.
The Act additionally provides that no person is required to
disclose the identity of an adoptive parent or an adopted child un-
less disclosure is authorized by the adoptive parent, by the adopted
child if over 14 years of age, or by the court in exceptional cases
when good cause is shown.04 The express intent of this provision"' '
is to meet the problem presented in Anonymous v. Anonymous""'
wherein the attorney for the adoptive parents had refused to disclose
the names of the adoptive parents or the new name of the adopted
child. This information was sought by the biological mother so that
she might bring an action to withdraw her consent. In finding for
the biological mother, the court held that the attorney-client privi-
lege was inapplicable and directed the attorney to disclose the de-
sired information. Under the RUAA, the individual seeking such
information would be required to show good cause before the court
would grant access to the information.' 7
99. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-216 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
100. 1947 Ark. Acts 269, § 17 (repealed 1977).
101. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-117 (1971) (amended by 1955 Ark. Acts 269, § 1) (repealed
1977).
102. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-217(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
103. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-217(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
104. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-217 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
105. UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT, (U.L.A.) § 7, Commissioner's note, at 22.
106. 59 Misc. 2d 149, 294 N.Y.2d 345 (1969).
107. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-217(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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K. Inheritance
Perhaps the most drastic change that the RUAA makes to exist-
ing law is in the area of inheritance. It provides that the adopted
child can no longer inherit from his biological parents.', It has been
stated that this is the modem trend to ease the transition from the
old family to the new family by making a complete break from
former family ties, while at the same time preserving the secrecy of
the adoption.'"0 This change raises a question concerning the effect
of the RUAA on the status of the adoptive child who is not specifi-
cally excluded from a will. It has been stated that, "[Iun the ab-
sence of [an] express provision [excluding adopted children from
a will], it may well be that the broad terms of the [Uniform Adop-
tion] Act would incline to the inclusion of the adoptee."' ' 0
The RUAA fulfills prior legislative intent in multiple adoption
108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977) states that "[aj final decree
of adoption and an interlocutory decree of adoption which has become final .. .have the
following effect...: (1) . . .to terminate all legal relationships between the adopted individ-
ual and his relatives, including his natural parents. ... This section replaces ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 61-147 (1971) (repealed 1977) which stated that "[aln adopted child may inherit from
his natural parents and from their lineal and collateral kindred."
109. UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT, (U.L.A.) § 14, Commissioner's note, at 32.
110. Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law, 40 IOWA L. REV. 299, 321 (1955).
Arkansas was formerly in accord with this position. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-147(f) (1971)
(repealed 1977). The former statute provided that "[an adopted child, if not mentioned by
name or by reference to a class in The Will of an adoptive parent, will inherit from that
parent as a pretermitted child." The Commissioners of the Uniform Adoption Act stated that
by using the word "child" this section is intended to include the adopted child whenever the
word "child" or similar word such as "issue" is used in an instrument unless an adopted
individual is expressly excluded. UNIFORM ADOPTION Acr, (U.L.A.) § 14, Commissioner's note,
at 32.
The courts, however, do not agree on the exact definition of the terms that classify
beneficiaries of wills. In Moore v. McAlester, 428 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1967) an Oklahoma court
construed its version of the Uniform Adoption Act holding that an adopted child is not
included in the phrase "issue of her body." The court stated that the phrase had a well
defined meaning and was "customarily used (as distinguished from the word 'issue') for one
purpose and one purpose only-to exclude adopted children from the class described." Id. at
270.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the phrases "heirs of the body," Davis v.
Davis, 219 Ark. 623, 243 S.W.2d 739 (1951); "bodily heirs," Nuckolls v. Mantooth, 234 Ark.
64, 350 S.W.2d 512 (1961); and "issue," Bilsky v. Bilsky, 248 Ark. 1060,455 S.W.2d 901 (1970)
did not include adopted children. In 1961 it was reported that the outer limits of statutory
interpretation in Arkansas included adopted individuals in the term "children" but not in
the terms "heirs" or "bodily heirs." 15 ARK. L. REv. 194, 199 (1961). But see Major v.
Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. App. 1953). In Davis there was a vigorous dissent by Judge
Holt. The dissent pointed out that the language of the statute could not be plainer, and that
the words "as if born to them in legal wedlock" placed the adopted child in "exactly" the
same position as natural children. Davis v. Davis, 219 Ark. 623, 626, 243 S.W.2d 739, 741-42
(1951) (Holt, J., dissenting).
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situations. In Hawkins v. Hawkins"' it was held that in situations
of multiple adoptions of one person, the adopted person could in-
herit from both adoptive parents. Subsequently, the Arkansas legis-
lature enacted a statute which specifically overruled this decision." 2
Under the RUAA, the natural parents' relationship with their child
is totally severed when an adoption proceeding is completed. ':1
Thus, if an individual who had been adopted one time were to be
adopted a second time, the first adoptive parent would be in the
place of the natural parent in a normal proceeding. The relationship
of the first adoptive parent would therefore be severed from the
adopted child and that child could not inherit from him."'
L. Termination and Relinquishment of Parental Rights
The final section of the RUAA provides for the termination and
relinquishment of the parent-child relationship."' The execution of
a written relinquishment has the effect of severing all parental
rights, including the right to control the child, the right to withhold
consent to an adoption, and the right to receive notice of a hearing
on a petition for adoption.
A written relinquishment signed by the parent may occur in
two ways. The first is when an agency is to take custody of the child.
In this situation a relinquishment may be made by the parent in the
presence of a representative of the agency or a judge of a court of
record."' In all other situations the following three prerequisites
must be satisfied: (1) the person petitioning for adoption and seek-
ing the relinquishment of the natural parent must have had custody
of the child to be adopted for two years; (2) the relinquishment will
not be-considered unless the biological parent has received notice
of the petition for adoption; and (3) the court must find the adop-
tion action to be in the best interest of the child."'
The relinquishment may be revoked as a matter of right within
ten days after it is granted or the child is born, whichever is later.
This provision applies only when an agency is to take custody of the
111. 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951).
112. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-147(c) (1971) (repealed 1977). For a full discussion see
Wright, The New Arkansas Inheritance Laws: A Step into the Present with an Eye to the
Future, 23 ARK. L. REV. 313, 334 (1969).
113. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
114. The RUAA does not change the intent of ARK. STAT ANN. § 61-147(c) (1971)
(repealed 1977).
115. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
116. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
117. Id. at (b)(2).
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child."8 A relinquishment may also be withdrawn upon the motion
of the parent if the child has not been placed for adoption and the
person having custody of the child consents to the withdrawal." '
The court may also terminate the parent-child relationship.'2 ,
The RUAA allows the petition of termination to be brought in con-
junction with an adoption proceeding.'' The grounds upon which
the court may issue a decree of termination are set out. Briefly,
these grounds are abandonment,' 2 misconduct, continuous neglect,
or unreasonable withholding of consent by a parent not having cus-
tody of the child.' 3
The effect of a decree terminating the parent-child relation has
the expressed consequence of dispensing with the necessity of notice
and consent in a later adoption proceeding.'24 Before the termina-
tion petition may be heard, however, notice of the petition must be
given to the biological parents. As discussed previously in Section
I. E., the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that any action against
a minor without the appointment of a guardian ad litem is voidable
on direct attack.' '2 In addition, the decree may be subsequently
overturned by the court on the motion of the biological parent if the
child has not been placed for adoption and the person having cus-
tody over the child consents to vacation of the decree.
The termination provision can be a valuable aid in protecting
the identity of the adoptive parents. The petition for termination
may be brought prior to an adoption proceeding; it dispenses with
the necessity of the notice to and the consent of the biological par-
ents to the adoption itself.'2 Furthermore, the termination proceed-
ing may be brought in conjunction with the adoption proceeding,
but the natural parent must be given notice of the hearing and an
opportunity to be heard.'"
II. RELATED SOCIAL ISSUES
A. Religion
One aspect of the prior law which was not expressly re-enacted
118. Id. at (b)(1).
119. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(g) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
120. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
121. Id.
122. See section I. E. supra.
123. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
124. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
125. 260 Ark. 114, 539 S.W.2d 415 (1976).
126. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
127. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-220(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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in the RUAA was the requirement that the petitioner be adjudged
"morally fit."'' 21 In some jurisdictions, a specific finding of moral
fitness may be encompassed by the phrase "in the best interest of
the child."'' 9 While few people would contend that the absence of
this provision allows a morally unfit person to adopt, it does raise
the question of what role, if any, the religion of the parents should
play in the adoption process. Some jurisdictions make it a require-
ment "when practical" to place a child with people of the same or
a similar religious belief. 30 Other jurisdictions construe the religion
of the parties as only one factor among several to be considered.'"
Arkansas leaves it to the discretion of the trial court." ' In a pam-
phlet published and distributed by the Arkansas Social Services, it
was stated that "no particular church attendance is required or
preferred."' It therefore appears that the Arkansas provision will
withstand any first amendment attacks that other states have en-
countered. ' 31
B. Combating the Gray Market
The RUAA requires the petitioner to file a full accounting re-
port of all disbursements of anything valuable made, or agreed to
be made, in connection with any adoption proceeding. :15 This sec-
tion is based on a California law 3 and is designed to control abuses
that occur in private placements. 7 It has been reported that
"[i]nstances of large medical or legal fees collected in adoption
proceedings have led to a demand that all fees and expenses con-
nected with an adoption should be reported to the court.' '13 8
The reason for the abuse is clear-there are more parents who
wish to adopt than there are available children. The basic economic
principle of supply and demand dictates that the baby market is,
128. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-108(d) (1971) (repealed 1977).
129. 9 ARK. L. REV. 167, 169 (1954-1955).
130. In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942
(1955).
131. In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
132. See 9 ARK. L. REV. 167, 169 (1954-1955).
133. Ark. Social Services, Happiness in a Home with Children-Parenthood through
Adoption, reprinted in part in Arkansas Adoptions, supra note 4, at 31.
134. See In re Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954); In re Adoption of E, 59
N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971).
135. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-211 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
136. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224r (West Supp. 1978).
137. UNIFORM ADOPTION Acr, (U.L.A.) § 10, Commissioner's note, at 26.
138. 38 S.B.J. 640 (1963).
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and will continue to be, a seller's market.' There are two distinct
types of markets, referred to as a gray market and a black market.
The black market has been defined as independent adoptive place-
ment in which a third party makes a profit."10 The gray market is
similar but the profit motive is replaced by the good intentions of
doctors, lawyers, friends, and parents. 4'
It would be naive to contend that such activities are not occur-
ring in Arkansas. In 1958 an attorney for the State Department of
Public Welfare stated that "at least four examples of the outright
sale of babies" had occurred in Arkansas. 4 ' He went on to comment
that the control against "the selling of flesh" in Arkansas was the
high integrity of Arkansas judges and attorneys.43 Unfortunately,
the Act fails to solve the problem. As noted by the original drafters,
failure to comply with this section neither invalidates the adoption
nor prohibits the petitioner from obtaining the child.'44
Many commentators agree that the ills attendant in private or
"gray" placements can be cured, or at least controlled, by requiring
a report and investigation by the state adoption agency.'45 A state
agency does not usually place a child in a home unless it has done
the following: (1) made an investigation of the medical and psychol-
ogical histories of the natural parents, with an attentive eye toward
symptoms that might indicate epilepsy, feeblemindedness, or psy-
chosis; (2) conducted a thorough study of the child; and (3) com-
piled a total evaluation of the adoptive parents.'46 Furthermore, the
persons conducting the investigation are trained in these matters
and can more readily recognize latent problems which are not ap-
parent at the time of adoption.'47 The investigation and report by
the agency covers the adoptive home and the individual to be
adopted. The court should use this information to create a family
unit that will encounter only normal problems and to avoid those
139. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoption, 59
YALE L.J. 715, 715 (1950).
140. Id.
141. Id. at n.2.
142. Smith, supra note 80, at 74.
143. Id.
144. UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT, (U.L.A.) § 10, Commissioner's note, at 26.
145. See, Smith, supra note 80, at 75. There are usually two types of home studies that
a state agency may prepare. (1) The first procedure applies to private placements. If the child
is already in the adoption home, the court may ask the Social Services Division to evaluate
the home and report to the court on whether the home is a suitable place for the child. (2)
The second procedure applies if the adoption is through a state agency. The agency requests
an exhaustive study of the potential adoptive home before the child is placed there. Id.
146. Comment, supra note 40.
147. Comment, supra note 139, at 718.
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problems that might place too great a strain on the new relationship
of parent and child.
III. CONCLUSION
The RUAA is of major importance. It has changed the law of
Arkansas in a number of ways. It has made adoption available to
more people by allowing minors and persons legally separated from
their spouses to adopt. Formerly in Arkansas, these people could not
adopt.
The provisions of the RUAA that relate to notice and consent
are complex. Some situations, however, such as those in Stanley
and Schrum, are not covered by the Act; therefore, attorneys are
advised to give notice to the natural father of an illegitimate child
if there has been a parental relationship established. Likewise, when
the parents of an adoptive child are both minors, the appointment
of a guardian ad litem would protect the validity of their consents.
The Act balances the various interests involved in adoption
proceedings. The RUAA appropriately tips the scales to ensure that
the best interests of the child are always considered. It also grants
more power to the court. Since each adoption proceeding will have
its own unique circumstances, it is best that the court have the
latitude to address each case appropriately.
[Note by Terry L. Derden]
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